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ASSESSING THE COSTS OF REGULATION: 
THE CASE OF DUAL TRADING* 
TOM SMITH and ROBERT E. WHALEY 
Duke University 
THE practice of dual trading in futures exchanges across the United 
States has existed since the advent of organized futures markets in the 
mid-1800s. Under a dual trader market-making system, market makers 
are permitted to execute transactions for customers and on personal ac- 
count. With two sources of income to cover the costs of operation- 
brokerage commissions and dealer/speculator p ofits-dual trader mar- 
kets have greater numbers of market makers than otherwise comparable 
markets that permit traders to earn income from only brokerage or deal- 
ing/speculation. With more market makers, the level of competition for 
providing the market-making service is increased, thereby increasing 
market liquidity and lowering the costs of trading (that is, brokerage 
commissions and the bid/ask spread).1 
Dual trading prevails on security and futures exchanges in the United 
States as well as in other countries. Grossman provides a comprehensive 
list of dual trader markets worldwide.2 In futures markets, a substantial 
proportion of total trading volume is executed by dual traders. The Com- 
* We thank Todd Petzel at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for providing us with 
information regarding the top-step rule in the S&P 500 index futures pit. Margaret Monroe 
provided extremely useful and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Com- 
ments and suggestions by Steven Figlewski, F. Douglas Foster, Hans R. Stoll, Joseph R. 
Sweeney, an anonymous referee, and the seminar participants at Duke University, Indiana 
University, Southern Methodist University, the University of Oklahoma, the 1990 Northern 
Finance Association meetings in Banff, Alberta, and the 1992 Western Finance Association 
meetings in San Francisco are also gratefully acknowledged. Research support was received 
from the Business Associates' Fund (Smith) and the Isle Maligne Fund (Whaley). 
' Other arguments in support of dual trader markets have also been suggested. Some 
argue that dual traders operate more efficiently than do exclusive brokers because their 
own money is at risk. Others argue that dual traders can provide lower transaction costs 
because they are better informed about the market and/or have superior trading skills as a 
result of handling both personal and customer orders. 
2 Sanford J. Grossman, An Economic Analysis of Dual Trading 62-72 (working paper, 
University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Rodney L. White Center for Financial Re- 
search, 1989). 
[Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXXVII (April 1994)] 
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modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) study of futures exchanges 
in the United States, for example, reports that over 50 percent of trading 
volume is executed by individuals who transact for themselves as well 
as customers.3 
Dual trading is criticized because when a broker can trade on behalf 
of customers and on his own account a potential conflict of interest arises. 
One such conflict is called "front-running." Consider a broker who re- 
ceives a large customer buy order that will surely move the futures price 
upward. A dual trader could buy futures on personal account first and 
then execute his customer's order. When execution of the customer order 
drives the price upward, the broker liquidates his position at a profit. 
Front-running is difficult todetect.4 Consequently, the CFTC, from time 
to time, contemplates restricting or banning dual trading in futures 
markets. 
Fishman and Longstaff analyze the effects that restricting dual trading 
may have on trading costs.5 In markets where dual traders do not front- 
run, they show that a ban on dual trading will decrease bid/ask spreads. 
The intuition for this result is that market makers can afford to decrease 
spreads because they will face fewer information-based (money-losing) 
trades. To compensate for lost profits on dual trading, brokers raise com- 
missions. In markets where dual traders front-run, Fishman and Long- 
staff show that banning dual trading may or may not increase spreads. 
Restricting or banning dual trading activity, however, provides no as- 
surance that front-running activity or trading costs will be reduced. Even 
in the absence of dual trading, brokers could conspire with others to 
profit from the trades of informed customers. While the theoretical rgu- 
3 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Economic Analysis of Dual Trading on Com- 
modity Exchanges (report prepared by the Division of Economic Analysis, November 
1989). This proportion is likely understated because, in the CFTC study, dual traders are 
defined as traders who act for customers and for personal account in the same commodity 
on the same day. Such a definition fails to include traders who execute transactions for 
customers in one commodity contract and for themselves in a closely related commodity 
contract such as a futures option contract, an option contract, or a futures contract on a 
commodity that is a close substitute. 
4 Detailed time and sales data compiled by the futures exchanges safeguard, as much as 
possible, such trading abuses. Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller, Economic Costs 
and Benefits of the Proposed One-Minute Time Bracketing Regulations, 6 J. Futures Mar- 
kets 145 (1986), for example, examine the costs and benefits of implementing a one-minute 
time bracketing regulation and find that "the upper bound to the economic benefits from 
eliminating abusive dual trading with one-minute bracketing comes to less than 1 cent per 
contract." Nevertheless, handheld electronic trading card systems that provide instanta- 
neous information about the trading activity of each broker/market maker are being contem- 
plated. If implemented, these systems should alleviate concerns about possible abusive 
trading practices. 
5 Michael J. Fishman & Francis A. Longstaff, Dual Trading in Futures Markets, 47 J. 
Fin. 643 (1992). 
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ments about the effects of restricting dual trading can be persuasive, 
ultimately, the resolution of the debate will come through empirical exam- 
ination and evidence. Unfortunately, comparing the operations of dual 
and nondual trader markets is not as easy as it may seem. There are few 
instances where dual and nondual traders markets on the same futures 
operate simultaneously or where a single futures contract market has 
operated with exclusively dual and nondual trading during different pe- 
riods of time. The focus of this analysis is on one instance when a futures 
exchange voluntarily restricted ual trading in an active futures pit-in 
June 1987, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) implemented a "top- 
step rule," which permits only exclusive brokers access to the top step 
of the S&P 500 index futures pit. An effect of the rule has been to curtail 
substantially the volume of trading executed by dual traders. The purpose 
of this study is to assess the economic cost of regulating dual trading by 
estimating the increase in the effective bid/ask spread resulting from the 
implementation f the CME's top-step rule in the S&P 500 index futures 
market. 
The outline of the article is as follows. Section I discusses the possible 
economic implications of restricting dual trading, including increases in 
the effective bid/ask spread and brokerage commission rates and a de- 
crease in market liquidity. Our focus is primarily on the cost of immedi- 
acy in futures markets-the effective bid/ask spread. Differences or 
changes in the spread are a means of assessing the cost of restricting 
trading. In Section II, the measurement of the effective bid/ask spread 
from futures exchange times and sales data is discussed. Section III con- 
tains the empirical analysis. The implementation f the CME's top-step 
rule in June 1987 appears to have increased the effective bid/ask spread 
in the S&P 500 futures market. Section IV concludes the study with a 
brief summary. 
I. RESTRICTING DUAL TRADING AND MARKET MAKER SPREADS 
Futures trading is conducted in a pit on an exchange floor by a number 
of different types of traders. Some traders are exclusive brokers, who 
execute transactions on behalf of customers (hedgers and long-term spec- 
ulators) whose orders are called in. Other traders are exclusive dealers 
or scalpers, who make markets by quoting bid and ask prices for custom- 
ers who demand immediate xecution. Others are exclusive short-term 
speculators, who trade only for their own account and attempt to profit 
from intraday price movements. Yet another group of traders are dual 
traders, who may act both as broker and dealer/speculator. Some dual 
traders tend to scalp more than broker. Occasionally, they act as broker 
when customer demand is high. In contrast, some dual traders earn their 
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income primarily from brokerage commissions and scalp/speculate only 
when customer demand is low. Seldom do any of these traders, dual or 
nondual, hold positions overnight. 
This study deals with the possible consequences of restricting or ban- 
ning dual trading. In the absence of trading abuse and fraud, the cost of 
trading cannot be reduced by forcing dual traders to operate exclusively 
as brokers or dealer/speculators. Presumably, both sources of income 
are important to dual traders, otherwise they would voluntarily choose 
to engage exclusively in one activity or the other. Likely outcomes of 
restricting or banning dual trading, therefore, are that dual traders who 
predominantly scalp will increase bid/ask spreads to compensate for lost 
brokerage commissions and dual traders who predominantly broker will 
increase brokerage commission rates to compensate for lost dealer/spec- 
ulator profits. In addition, the supply of both services is likely to be 
reduced, thereby reducing market liquidity. 
In this study, we focus on the effects of restricting dual trading on the 
effective bid/ask spread. In June 1987, the CME voluntarily implemented 
the top-step rule in the S&P 500 futures pit. Under this rule, only exclu- 
sive brokers are permitted access to the top step of the pit, where a high 
proportion of total transactions are executed. If the effect of this rule has 
been to reduce competition and hence market liquidity, spreads should 
be higher in the period after the implementation f the rule than before. 
In contrast, if the restricted ual trader market after the implementation 
of the rule is no less competitive, the effective spread should be no dif- 
ferent. 
Before examining the differences between the effective spreads during 
the two time periods, however, it is necessary to have a clear understand- 
ing of the economic determinants ofthe effective bid/ask in the futures 
markets. This section is divided into three parts. In the first, the economic 
determinants ofmarket maker spreads are discussed, and a summary of 
empirical results of investigations in stock markets is provided. In the 
second, the focus turns to modeling the bid/ask spread in futures markets. 
Finally, in the third subsection, we discuss how the economic benefits/ 
costs of dual trader markets may be assessed in part by examining the 
effects of the implementation f the top-step rule. 
A. Determinants of the Bid/Ask Spread 
Models of market maker spreads have appeared in the finance and 
economics literature for many years.6 In general, these studies model the 
6 The first model to appear in the literature is that of Harold Demsetz, The Cost of 
Transacting, 82 Q. J. Econ. 33 (1968). Subsequent stock market studies include Seha Tinic, 
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CASE OF DUAL TRADING 219 
market maker's bid/ask spread, SPRDt, as a function of the security 
transaction rate (the number of contracts traded per day, for example), 
VOL,, the number of competing dealers, ND,, and risk, RISK,, that is, 
SPRD, = f(VOLt, ND,, RISK,). (1) 
The market maker's spread should vary inversely with volume of trading. 
The higher the rate of inventory turnover, the less the market maker 
needs to charge per transaction. The spread should also vary inversely 
with the number of competing market makers ince competition presum- 
ably causes each market maker to operate more efficiently. Finally, since 
the value of the portfolio f securities that the market maker holds at a 
particular point of time may change unexpectedly, the market maker 
needs to be compensated for risk.7 
Empirical work examining various specifications of (1) is largely fo- 
cused on stock markets and concludes that the determinants posited are 
well-supported by the data. Benston and Hagerman, for example, find 
that spread varies significantly and inversely with number of shareholders 
and the number of competing dealers and significantly and directly with 
unsystematic risk for a sample of 314 over-the-counter (OTC) stocks dur- 
ing the five-year period 1963-67.8 The number of shareholders serves as 
a proxy variable for volume of shares traded since share volume for the 
sample's stocks was unavailable. The use of the unsystematic risk vari- 
able as a risk variable is motivated by the fact that the market maker is 
expected to earn a rate of return commensurate ohis inventory's system- 
atic risk level. Only to the extent that the market maker is not well- 
diversified (that is, to the extent hat the market maker sustains unsystem- 
atic risk) should he be rewarded through the bid/ask spread. Price per 
share is also included as an independent variable since the regression 
is cross-sectional. Holding other factors constant, a twenty-dollar stock 
The Economics of Liquidity Services, 86 Q. J. Econ. 79 (1972); George Benston & Robert 
Hagerman, Determinants of Bid/Asked Spreads in the Over-the-Counter Market, 1 J. Fin. 
Econ. 353 (1974); Hans R. Stoll, Dealer Inventory Behavior: An Empirical Investigation of 
NASDAQ Stocks, 11 J. Fin. Quant. Anal. 359 (1976); Hans R. Stoll, The Supply of Dealer 
Services in Securities Markets, 33 J. Fin. 1133 (1978); and Hans R. Stoll, The Supply of 
Dealer Services: An Empirical Analysis of NASDAQ Stocks, 33 J. Fin. 1153 (1978). 
Sarahelen R. Thompson & Mark L. Waller, Determinants of Liquidity Costs in Commodity 
Futures Markets, 7 Rev. Futures Markets 110 (1988), examine liquidity costs in the corn 
and oats futures pits at the CBT. 
7 The model presented here focuses only on the order processing and inventory holding 
costs incurred by the market maker. While adverse information costs could also be modeled 
within this framework, we chose to mitigate the effects of adverse information by the sample 
selection procedure described in Section III. 
8 Benston & Hagerman, supra note 6. To be more precise about model specification, 
Benston and Hagerman use the logarithm of variables indicated. 
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should have a greater spread than a ten-dollar stock since the market 
maker's total carrying cost is greater. Other investigators such as Stoll 
control for this effect by using the relative spread (the bid/ask spread 
divided by the average of the bid and ask prices) as the dependent 
variable.9 
B. Modeling the Bid/Ask Spread in Futures Markets 
The theoretical models of the market maker's spread have generally 
been tested using stock market data, although the models apply equally 
well for bid/ask spreads in other markets uch as commodity futures 
markets. Like stock markets, spreads in futures markets hould decrease 
with the volume of trading (economies of scale) and with the number of 
competing traders (competition). Risk is also an important determinant 
of the effective spread because the market maker faces the prospect of a 
significant market movement while he has an open position in the futures. 
Risk may not enter the bid/ask spread model in the futures market 
regression as strongly as it does in the regression model for the stock 
market. In the stock market, the market maker cannot effectively hedge 
the value of his inventory. A specialist on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), for example, is prohibited from hedging the risk of his stock 
position using stock options. In contrast, a futures market maker can 
more effectively manage his risk exposure by hedging with different con- 
tract months in the same commodity, futures options, options, or futures 
on other commodities. In addition, futures market makers can minimize 
their risk exposure by quickly reversing positions acquired. Silber esti- 
mates that the average length of time that a scalper holds a position is 
about two minutes."1 In fact, Silber reports that the scalper's returns are 
negative for positions held longer than three minutes. 
Finally, studies of stock market spreads adjust for the price per share 
of the stock. This is done to account for the differences inspreads across 
stocks resulting from different capital investments. Higher-priced stocks 
have higher carrying costs, so the spread must be measured relative to 
the amount of capital tied up (price per share). In futures markets, how- 
ever, no capital investment is required. Not even futures margin should 
affect he size of the spread since market makers (scalpers) only day 
trade and have no need to post margin. 
9 Stoll, The Supply of Dealer Services: An Empirical Analysis, supra note 6. 
10 William Silber, Marketmaker Behavior in an Auction Market: An Analysis of Scalpers 
in Futures Markets, 39 J. Fin. 950 (1984). This behavior is documented for the New York 
Futures Exchange's NYSE Composite index futures contract during the period December 
1, 1982-January 14, 1983. 
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.19 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 01:56:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CASE OF DUAL TRADING 221 
C. Assessing the Cost of Restricting Dual Trading 
The economic models outlined can, in principle, be used to distinguish 
between dual traders and exclusive dealers as market makers in the fu- 
tures pit. The problem of differentiating between the two types of market 
makers is that all active commodity futures markets currently permit dual 
trading. Bid/ask spreads may well be lower when dual traders are present 
in the market han when they are not or vice versa, but examining spreads 
in a market where both dual traders and exclusive dealers are permitted 
will not make this apparent. In a competitive market, bid/ask spreads 
offered by dual traders and exclusive dealers should be the same. If 
exclusive dealers offered spreads in excess of those of dual traders, they 
would attract little business from customers and would either lower the 
price of their services or be forced from the market. However, if dual 
traders abused their position by trading ahead of customer orders, the 
effective costs of executing a transaction through dual traders would be 
higher than through exclusive dealers, so subsequent customer transac- 
tions would be placed through exclusive dealers. In a competitive market, 
the only situation in which dual traders and exclusive dealers can coexist 
is where both charge the same fee for providing market liquidity (that is, 
the effective bid/ask spread)." 
To make a direct comparison of the effectiveness of dual trader and 
nondual trader markets, the commodity underlying the futures contract in 
the two markets has to be identical-either (a) dual and nondual traders 
markets on the same commodity operating simultaneously, or (b) a single 
market in which there have been periods of exclusively dual and exclu- 
sively nondual trading. In general, few such situations arise. While simul- 
taneous dual/nondual markets exist, the market activity in the nondual 
trader market is so low that effective comparisons are not possible.'2 
Approach (a) is therefore infeasible. With respect to approach (b), the 
first instance in which a futures market voluntarily restricted dual trading 
was on June 22, 1987, when the CME implemented a top-step rule in the 
S&P 500 index futures pit.13 Under this rule, only exclusive brokers are 
allowed access to the top step of the pit, where a high proportion of 
trades are executed. An effect of this rule has been to reduce substantially 
" This argument does not necessarily apply to brokerage services since brokerage cus- 
tomers are interested in both low commissions and quick execution. 
12 For example, foreign currency futures contracts trade in dual trader markets at the 
CME in Chicago and in nondual trader markets at the Philadelphia Board of Trade (PBOT) 
in Philadelphia. 
13 Recently, the CME prohibited dual trading in all contracts that trade an average of at 
least 10,000 contracts a day. 
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the proportion of trades executed by dual traders. In Section III, we 
investigate empirically the effects that the top-step rule has had on the 
trading volume and the effective bid/ask spread in the S&P 500 futures 
market. Prior to conducting the investigation, however, it is necessary 
to develop a methodology for estimating the effective spread. 
II. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTIVE BID/ASK SPREAD 
To be precise in our assessment about the effect of the implementation 
of the top-step rule on the cost of immediacy, an accurate estimator of 
the effective bid/ask spread is necessary. The effective or realized spread 
differs from the quoted spread. The quoted spread is the difference be- 
tween the market maker's bid and ask quotes, while the effective spread 
is the difference b tween the price at which the market maker buys (sells) 
the futures and the price at which he subsequently sells (buys) it.'4 Our 
focus is on the effective spread since it is the cost incurred in aggregate 
by the customers using the futures market. 
Measuring directly the effective spread in futures markets is not possi- 
ble because the trading records of the market makers are not publicly 
available. Instead, the spread must be inferred from the transaction 
prices. Futures exchanges do not record a complete history of the trans- 
action prices and trading volumes-they record only "time and sales" 
data. Time and sales data include only the time and the price of each 
futures contract ransaction, where the price in the transaction isdifferent 
from the price recorded previously. Bid (ask) prices also appear on the 
time and sales data file if the bid (ask) price exceeds (is below) the previ- 
ously recorded transaction price. No trading volume figures are recorded. 
Two types of estimators have been used to measure the effective bid/ 
ask spread in the past research using time and sales data. One estimator 
is based on the first-order, serial covariance of price changes. Roll dem- 
onstrates that if true price changes are serially dependent, the effective 
bid/ask spread can be estimated as 
SA = 2 
/-cov(APt, APt1), 
(2) 
14 TO illustrate, assume that the quoted spread for the S&P 500 futures is .05 (250.00 bid/ 
250.05 ask). Assume further that in the course of market making, a scalper buys fifty 
contracts at 250.00. Current customer market orders to buy might absorb only part of the 
scalper's position, say, forty contracts at 250.05. Since the remaining ten contracts pose 
significant risk, the scalper may attempt to liquidate the position more quickly by tempo- 
rarily lowering his ask price to, say, 250.00, making his offer the most attractive in the pit. 
Further customer market orders will automatically flow to the scalper, and his remaining 
position will be liquidated (through "scratch sales"). While the quoted spread in this exam- 
ple is .05, the effective spread is .04. 
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.19 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 01:56:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CASE OF DUAL TRADING 223 
where P0 is the observed futures price at time t.'5 In this model, if the 
observed price of the futures is at the bid (ask), the next price change 
transaction is equally likely to be zero or plus (minus) the amount of the 
spread. While the use of (2) seems relatively straightforward, estimates 
of cov(AP?, AP_ 1) using futures time and sales data are frequently posi- 
tive. This arises because the negative serial dependence induced by fu- 
tures market bid/ask spreads is small relative to the short-term positive 
serial dependence in true price changes resulting from new information. 
With positive serial covariance, the estimate of SA is meaningless.16 The other estimator used to infer the effective spread is the mean abso- 
lute value of price change, 
T 
1 
SB = API = T API, (3) 
t=1 
where T is the length of the futures price change series. Thompson and 
Waller and the CFTC study endorse this approach." If the expected true 
futures price change and the variance of true price change are both zero, 
this estimator would capture the effective spread. Unfortunately, while 
it is reasonable to assume that the expected price change of the futures 
from transaction to transaction is zero, assuming that the variance of 
futures price changes is zero is unrealistic. The mean absolute price 
change, IAP , therefore consists of two components-the bid/ask spread 
and the variance of true price changes. The estimator I APO is therefore 
upward-biased, with the magnitude of the bias depending on the variance 
of true price changes. 
Smith and Whaley offer a new approach. They18 develop a method-of- 
moments estimator of the effective bid/ask spread that explicitly recog- 
nizes that the mean absolute price change contains the price change vari- 
ance attributable to the bid/ask spread as well as the variance of true 
price changes. To isolate the two effects, they assume that true price 
15 Richard Roll, A Simple Implicit Measure of the Bid/Ask Spread in an Efficient Market, 
39 J. Fin. 1127 (1984). 
16 The problem of imaginary numbers is not the only problem with using the Roll estima- 
tor on time and sales data. Roll's model assumes that there is a 50 percent chance that the 
next observed transaction price will be at its current level. Time and sales data generally 
do not include consecutive transactions at the same price. If the current transaction price 
is at a bid (ask) level, in all likelihood the next recorded transaction will be at an ask (bid) 
level. 
17 Thompson & Waller, supra note 6; and Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
supra note 3. 
18 Tom Smith & Robert E. Whaley, Estimating the Effective Bid/Ask Spread Using Time 
and Sales Data, J. Futures Markets (June 1994, in press). 
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changes are distributed normally with zero mean and variance, (2, and 
that bid and ask prices occur with equal probability. Under these assump- 
tions, the expected value of the absolute price change is 
22 S2 /2c2 _SCu (4) E(IAPO I) = -eC - SC + 2scN , (4) 
where sc is the bid/ask spread, (r2 is the variance of true price changes, 
and N(d) is the cumulative unit normal distribution function with upper 
integral limit d. Note that even if the bid/ask spread is zero, the expected 
absolute price change is positive. Substituting sc = 0 into (4) shows that 
the mean of the distribution fI APO I in the absence of a bid/ask spread is 
E(IAPoI) = cr . (5) 
Equation (4), by itself, cannot be used to estimate sc since both sc and 
r2 are unknown. In order to develop an estimator of the effective spread, 
a second equation is needed and can be obtained using the expected value 
of the squared price change, that is, 
E(IAP012) = C2 + S2. (6) 
To estimate the effective spread (and the variance of true price changes), 
replace E( IAPO ) and E( APO 12) with the mean absolute price change and 
the mean squared price change from the observed futures price change 
distribution a d then perform a nonlinear minimization o  the relations 
(4) and (6), constraining the volatility estimate to be nonnegative. 
III. TOP-STEP RULE INVESTIGATION 
On June 22, 1987, the CME implemented a top-step rule in the S&P 
500 index futures market. Under this rule, only exclusive brokers are 
allowed access to the top step of the pit, where a high proportion of total 
transactions are consummated. As a result, most transactions are now 
executed by brokers, and the amount of trading volume executed by 
dual traders has been substantially curtailed. Where 50 percent of trading 
volume was executed by dual traders in February 1987, dual traders ac- 
counted for only 11 percent of volume in September 1987.19 
In this section, the economic effect of the top-step rule is investigated. 
If there is no difference between markets that permit dual trading and 
19 These figures are taken from excerpts of a 1990 letter from the CME to the CFTC 
summarizing the effects of the introduction of the top-step rule. We thank Todd Petzel at 
the CME for providing these excerpts. 
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those that do not, the rule should have had no effect on the effective bid/ 
ask spread. However, if the restriction reduces competition, the effective 
spread may have increased. This section is divided into six parts. In the 
first, the data are described. The sources of the price and volume informa- 
tion and the construction of the variables used in our analysis are pro- 
vided. In the second subsection, changes in the pattern of trading volume 
across contract months before and after the introduction ofthe top-step 
rule are examined. The third subsection investigates the empirical proper- 
ties of the mean absolute price change and method-of-moments es ima- 
tors (sB and sc) that were discussed in Section II. The fourth subsection 
describes the simple and multiple regression models that are used to 
assess changes in the effective bid/ask spread resulting from the introduc- 
tion of the top-step rule. The fifth subsection contains the regression 
results for the S&P 500 futures market. In the sixth subsection, the effec- 
tive spreads and trading volumes of the S&P 500 and Major Market Index 
(MMI) futures contract markets are compared. 
A. Data 
To investigate the effect of the top-step rule, we examine the time and 
sales data for the S&P 500 index futures contracts for the period from 
contract inception on April 21, 1982, through one week prior to the Octo- 
ber 1987 stock market crash, October 9, 1987. These data were made 
available by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. In addition, we examine 
the time and sales data for the (MMI) futures contracts during the period 
January 2-October 9, 1987. These data were made available by the Chi- 
cago Board of Trade (CBT). Since the CBT placed no restriction on dual 
trading in the MMI futures pit, the MMI futures contract market can 
serve as a control group. 
By way of history, the CME introduced trading of the S&P 500 futures 
contract on April 21, 1982. These futures contracts followed a quarterly 
expiration cycle (March, June, September, December) and generally had 
times to maturity as long as one year. For a short period of time, the 
CME experimented with contract maturities xtending out more than one 
year. On June 17, 1983, six quarterly contract maturities became avail- 
able. On June 18, 1984, this number dropped to five, and on Septem- 
ber 24, 1984, the number fell to four. 
The CBT introduced trading of the MMI futures contract in July 1984. 
The original MMI futures contract was relatively small in denomination 
(100 times the index value), had minimum price increments of .10 index 
points, and followed a monthly expiration cycle. In July 1985, the CBT 
introduced a larger MMI futures contract (250 times the index level), the 
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"Maxi MMI," with minimum price increments of .05 index points and a 
quarterly expiration cycle. By mid-August 1985, this larger contract had 
assumed the greatest rading volume. Subsequently, the smaller contract 
was delisted and a monthly expiration cycle was introduced for the larger 
contract. Our analysis includes only the larger MMI contract during a 
period in which the contract was traded on a monthly expiration cycle- 
January 2-October 9, 1987. 
From the time and sales data of each futures exchange, two samples are 
created. The first sample, Sample 1, treats all records, including records 
reporting bid and ask quotes, as if they are actual transactions.20 The 
second sample, Sample 2, excludes bid and ask quotes as well as prices 
of transactions adjacent to quotes. The prices in adjacent transactions 
are eliminated because the price movement from the transaction record 
prior to a reported bid (ask) record to the transaction record after the bid 
(ask) record likely represents a price movement due to new information. 
To clarify the differences between the two samples, an illustration is
provided. The left column of Table 1 contains a short sequence of prices 
that appeared in the CME's time and sales data for the September 1982 
futures contract on April 23, 1982. In the center column are the price 
changes of Sample 1 computed from the time and sales data. Note that 
all prices are treated as if they are actual transactions. If n records are 
reported for the futures contract on a particular day, n - 1 price changes 
are computed. Note also that zero price changes appear where a transac- 
tion price appears after a bid/ask price at the same level. In the right 
column are the price changes of Sample 2. The number of price changes 
for a given day depends on the number of recorded bid/ask prices. A 
greater number of bid/ask quotes as a proportion of total price records 
for the day results in fewer computed price changes. Table 1, for exam- 
ple, shows only six computed price changes in a sequence of twenty 
recorded prices. On certain days, the number of bid/ask quotes for a 
distant maturity contract is so large that no Sample 2 price changes 
appear. 
Table 1 also serves to illustrate that only a single price is reported on 
each record in the time and sales data file. Simultaneous bid/ask spread 
quotes do not appear in the time and sales data as they do in many stock 
market ransaction files. Bid/ask spread quotes would have provided us 
with an alternative, direct measure of trading costs. The absence of direct 
20 Also on the file are records for transactions that are canceled or corrected. The can- 
celed records are eliminated because the transaction (price) was erroneously reported. The 
corrected (price) records are eliminated because the transactions may be out of chronologi- 
cal order. 
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TABLE 1 
AN EXAMPLE OF TIME AND SALES DATA AND THEIR RELATION TO 
SAMPLE 1 AND SAMPLE 2 PRICE CHANGES 
Time and Sales Sample 1 Sample 2 
Data: Price* Price Change Price Change 
119.90 ...... 
120.00 .10 .10 
119.95 -.05 -.05 
120.00 .05 .05 
120.05B .05 
120. 10B .05 
120.15A .05 
120.15 .00 
120.10A - .05 
120.05A - .05 
120.05 .00 
120.00A - .05 
119.95 -.05 
119.90 - .05 - .05 
119.85 -.05 -.05 
119.90B .05 
119.95 .05 
120.00B .05 
120.00 .00 
119.95 -.05 -.05 
Mean value .0026 -.0083 
Mean absolute value .0447 .0583 
NOTE.-The data are for the September 1982 S&P 500 index futures con- 
tract on April 23, 1982. 
* A denotes an ask quote; B denotes a bid quote. 
spread quotes, however, is a primary motivation for using the bid/ask 
spread estimators described in Section II. 
The effects of censoring the time and sales data to generate Sample 2 
are perhaps best understood by comparing the frequency of price changes 
in the two samples. Table 2 contains a summary of the frequency of price 
changes by contract maturity and tick size for the time and sales data for 
the S&P 500 futures contracts during the overall sample period April 21, 
1982-October 9, 1987. The tick size for the S&P 500 futures contract is 
.05, and price changes are categorized by actual and absolute price value. 
Note that the nearby futures contract has by far the greatest number of 
recorded price changes. The Sample 1 results indicate that there were 
more than 2.35 million price changes reported in the sample. Of these, 
the largest majority are one-tick price moves, however price moves of 
two ticks and larger are not uncommon. For more distant contracts, two- 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF ACTUAL AND ABSOLUTE PRICE CHANGE DISTRIBUTIONS BY CONTRACT MATURITY AND NUMBER OF TICKS 
NUMBER OF PRICE CHANGES 
CONTRACT Less than More than 
MONTH Total -2 ticks -2 ticks - 1 tick 0 ticks 1 tick 2 ticks 2 ticks 
Sample 1: 
Actual price 
changes: 
1 2,350,030 1,404 28,427 1,129,993 28,604 1,131,158 29,108 1,336 
2 910,771 3,072 38,562 365,415 93,863 368,526 38,404 2,929 
3 127,460 1,366 39,425 13,234 17,827 14,803 39,706 1,099 
4 19,231 247 7,203 741 2,328 961 7,496 255 
5 544 9 218 14 55 18 218 12 
6 302 23 140 10 26 9 90 4 
Absolute price 
changes: 
1 2,350,030 28,604 2,261,151 57,535 2,740 
2 910,771 93,863 733,941 76,966 6,001 
3 127,460 17,827 28,037 79,131 2,465 
4 19,231 2,328 1,702 14,699 502 
5 544 55 32 436 21 
6 302 26 19 230 27 
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Sample 2: 
Actual price 
changes: 
1 2,279,864 1,061 25,410 1,103,620 19,379 1,103,273 26,118 1,003 
2 394,797 1,044 10,778 184,024 3,273 183,521 11,066 1,091 
3 2,472 42 448 698 91 729 440 24 
4 90 0 19 14 9 24 24 0 
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Absolute price 
changes: 
1 2,279,864 19,379 2,206,893 51,528 2,064 
2 394,797 3,273 367,545 21,844 2,135 
3 2,472 91 1,427 888 66 
4 90 9 38 43 0 
5 1 0 0 1 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 
NOTE.-The data presented are for the S&P 500 index futures contract for all days in the sample period April 21, 1982-October 9, 1987. The tick size for the 
S&P 500 futures contract is .05. 
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tick price changes are more common than one-tick price changes. The 
Sample 1 results show this for the third through sixth contract maturities. 
The Sample 2 results, when contrasted with the Sample 1 results, show 
that the data censoring reduces the number of price changes in the sam- 
ple, with the relative size of reduction increasing by contract maturity. 
For example, the nearby contract had a total of 2.35 million price changes 
in Sample 1 and 2.28 million transactions in Sample 2. This represents 
about a 3 percent decrease. The second, third, and fourth contract maturi- 
ties experienced relative decreases of 56.6, 98.1, and 99.5 percent. More- 
over, the censoring virtually eliminates all price changes for the fifth and 
sixth contract maturities. All of these observations reflect the fact that 
trading volume decreases with the time to contract maturity. The nearby 
contract has the most active and continuous market, so few bid/ask 
quotes appear in the time and sales data. To the contrary, distant maturi- 
ties have few trades, so recorded time and sales data consist largely 
of bid/ask quotes, reflecting market movements without accompanying 
trades. Since our interest is in estimating the effective bid/ask spread 
from the price movements attributable to the bid/ask spread and not to 
new information, most of the interpretations in this section will focus on 
Sample 2 results. 
Another interesting aspect of Table 2 is that the price change distribu- 
tions are almost perfectly symmetric for both Sample 1 and Sample 2. 
This aspect is particularly reassuring considering that the method-of- 
moments estimator presented in Section II and applied later in this sec- 
tion assumes that true price changes are normally distributed. 
Besides the time and sales data for the S&P 500 index and MMI futures 
contracts, other data sources are used. Since trading volume has been 
shown to be an important determinant of the bid/ask spread in stock 
markets, daily trading volume information for each S&P 500 and MMI 
futures contract during the sample period was obtained from Tick Data, 
Inc. In the regressions that follow, the trading volume variable is ex- 
pressed in millions of futures contracts. 
The bid/ask spread has also been shown to be sensitive to risk, so a 
risk variable is estimated and used in the empirical analysis. Since the 
focus will be on explaining the variation in the effective daily bid/ask 
spread, risk must be measured on a daily basis. Two simple estimators 
of risk are the daily trading range21 or the square of the daily trading 
range; however, these estimators incorporate little information and are 
therefore xtremely noisy. Another possibility is the standard deviation 
of the price changes or returns of the futures across the transactions 
21 The daily trading range is the difference between the high and the low of the day. 
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recorded on the time and sales data; however, the volatility estimate 
obtained from transaction prices during the day is upward biased due to 
the influence of the bid/ask spread. Yet another possibility is the standard 
deviation estimate obtained as a by-product in the method-of-moments 
procedure described in Section II. Unfortunately, this standard eviation 
depends on the average time between prices, and the average time 
changes from contract o contract and from day to day. In addition, this 
estimate is spuriously correlated with the estimate of the implied spread 
by virtue of the simultaneous parameter estimation procedure.22 
The risk variable that we use in our analysis is the implied volatility 
from S&P 500 futures option prices. The implied volatility estimate is 
computed using a nonlinear egression of observed call and put option 
transaction prices for the S&P 500 futures option contract on model 
prices. The options are constrained to have a maturity between 15 and 
110 days. The futures price preceding the option transaction is used as 
an estimate of the true futures price. Where the futures option price is 
below the intrinsic value of the option, the transaction iseliminated from 
the sample. The model used to price the American-style futures options 
is the quadratic approximation of Barone-Adesi and Whaley.23 The risk- 
less rate of interest is the yield on the Treasury bill maturing just after 
the option expiration or the thirty-day Treasury bill, whichever has the 
longest maturity. The Treasury-bill discount rates from which the yields 
are computed are obtained from the Wall Street Journal. A single esti- 
mate of volatility is computed each day during the sample period. The 
S&P 500 futures options did not begin trading until March 1, 1983, so a 
shorter sample is used in the regression analysis that follows. The risk 
variable is an annualized rate-of-return standard eviation expressed in 
percentage form. 
B. Trading Volume Patterns 
Trading volume is used as an explanatory variable in the regression 
tests that follow. Before examining the results of those tests, however, 
it is interesting to note that there was a redistribution f trading volume 
by contract maturity after the implementation f the top-step rule. Table 
3 contains a summary of the trading volume of the S&P 500 index futures 
for the first four contract maturities.24 The first period from April 21, 
22 For a discussion of properties of the volatility estimated using the method of moments 
procedure, see Smith & Whaley, supra note 18. 
23 Giovanni Barone-Adesi & Robert E. Whaley, Efficient Analytic Approximation of 
American Option Values, 42 J. Fin. 301 (1987). 
24 The fifth and sixth contract maturities are dropped since they are not traded in all of 
the subperiods examined in the table. 
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TABLE 3 
TOTAL TRADING VOLUME OF S&P 500 INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS BY CONTRACT MATURITY 
NUMBER OF CONTRACTS TRADED 
(% of Total) 
CONTRACT April 21, 1982- June 24, 1985- June 23, 1986- June 22, 1987- 
MATURITY June 19, 1987 October 9, 1985 October 9, 1986 October 9, 1987 
Nearby 58,659,872 3,542,105 5,154,978 5,210,671 
(86.418) (86.237) (86.436) (88.008) 
2 9,132,846 561,275 804,010 699,427 
(13.455) (13.665) (13.481) (11.813) 
3 80,004 3,883 4,830 10,293 
(.118) (.095) (.081) (.174) 
Distant 6,483 156 93 262 
(.010) (.004) (.002) (.004) 
Total 67,879,205 4,107,419 5,963,911 5,920,653 
(100.000) (100.000) (100.000) (100.000) 
NOTE.-The data are provided for the overall pre-top-step-rule sample period April 21, 1982-June 19, 
1987, and during the three subperiods (a) June 24-October 9, 1985, (b) June 23-October 9, 1986, and 
(c) June 22-October 9, 1987. 
1982-June 19, 1987, is the period from when the S&P 500 futures began 
trading until when the top-step rule was first implemented. Note that the 
relative trading volumes of the four contract maturities are 86.41, 13.46, 
.12, and .01 percent, respectively. 
The second and third periods represent control group trading patterns. 
In general, the pattern of trading volume shifts by time of year as the 
nearby contract matures and an additional contract is added. Since the 
seventy-eight-day, post-top-step-rule period represents a specific interval 
in 1987 (June 22-October 9) among contract cycles, it is important that 
we evaluate trading volume patterns against the same interval during 
other years. The control groups that we form are for the period June 
24-October 9, 1985, where the relative trading volumes of the four con- 
tract maturities are 86.24, 13.66, .10, and .00 percent, respectively, and 
for the period June 23-October 9, 1986, where the relative trading vol- 
umes are 86.44, 13.48, .08, and .00 percent, respectively. Note that these 
trading patterns are not different from those of the overall pre-top-step- 
rule sample period. 
Interestingly, in the seventy-eight-day period after the introduction f
the top-step rule, the trading volume pattern is significantly different from 
either of the control groups.25 In particular, the proportion of total trading 
25 X2 tests of the null hypotheses that 1985 and 1986 control group periods have the same 
percentages of trading volume by contract maturity as the 1987 treatment group period are 
rejected at the .0001 probability level. 
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volume accounted for by the nearby contract, 88.01 percent, is consider- 
ably higher than the 86.24 percent reported for 1985 and the 86.44 percent 
reported for 1986. A possible explanation for this result is that dual trad- 
ers tend to make markets in more distant contract maturities. When the 
top-step rule restricted their trading activity, they either (a) became ex- 
clusive brokers in the nearby contract month where trading volume is 
highest or (b) left the S&P 500 futures pit because their ability to earn 
two sources of income, from brokerage and from scalping/speculation, 
had been impaired. 
The trading volume tests show that the implementation f the top-step 
rule appears to have influenced trading activity in the S&P 500 futures 
pit. The important question to answer, however, is not whether trading 
patterns have changed but rather whether trading costs have changed. 
C. Empirical Properties of the S&P 500 Spread Estimates 
Before beginning the analysis of the changes in the effective bid/ask 
spread resulting from the introduction of the top-step rule, we examine 
the empirical properties of the mean absolute price change and method- 
of-moments e timators of the effective bid/ask spread. Each estimator is
computed for each S&P 500 futures contract each day during the sample 
period26 using the price changes in Sample 1 and Sample 2. Table 4 con- 
tains the mean and the standard eviation of the daily spread estimates 
across days from the S&P 500 futures contract inception on April 21, 
1982, through one week prior to the October 1987 crash. The correlations 
between the daily estimates for the two spread estimation approaches are 
also reported. 
Several interesting results emerge from Table 4. First, comparing the 
descriptive statistics for the sB and sc estimates hows that the mean of 
the estimates of sc is consistently less than sB. This result is anticipated 
since the mean absolute price change s, contains not only the effective 
spread but also the variance of true price changes. Second, both the s, 
and sc estimates for the nearby S&P 500 futures contract are close to the 
minimum price movement (tick size). Considering that the nearby S&P 
500 futures contract is widely perceived to be a single-tick market, finding 
evidence to the contrary would have been surprising. Third, the correla- 
tion between the estimates is extremely high, indicating that the propor- 
tion of the mean absolute price change attributable tothe bid/ask spread 
is fairly stable from day to day, particularly when price changes are cen- 
sored in the manner of Sample 2. Finally, the spreads tend to increase 
26 We implicitly assume that the variance of true changes and the effective spread are 
constant throughout the trading day. 
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TABLE 4 
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND CORRELATION OF ESTIMATES OF THE S&P 500 INDEX 
FUTURES CONTRACT EFFECTIVE SPREAD 
SPREAD ESTIMATE MEAN 
(Standard Deviation) CORRELATION CONTRACT No. OF BETWEEN 
MATURITY OBSERVATIONS SB* SCt SB AND SC 
Sample 1: 
Pooled 6,103 .0669 .0636 .809 
(.0198) (.0198) 
Nearby 1,385 .0505 .0503 .478 
(.0035) (.0028) 
2 1,385 .0474 .0459 .773 
(.0075) (.0067) 
3 1,385 .0757 .0715 .753 
(.0134) (.0167) 
Distant 1,378 .0850 .0796 .304 
(.0123) (.0167) 
Sample 2: 
Pooled 3,205 .0556 .0546 .843 
(.0137) (.0130) 
Nearby 1,385 .0509 .0508 .680 
(.0043) (.0036) 
2 1,382 .0552 .0543 .728 
(.0104) (.0096) 
3 430 .0715 .0681 .850 
(.0257) (.0262) 
Distant 8 .0703 .0666 .928 
(.0188) (.0252) 
NOTE.-Data are provided for all days in the sample period April 21, 1982-October 9, 1987. * The estimator s, is the mean absolute value of the price changes, s, = TIPI = 1/T yT= IAPI, 
where T is the length of the time series. 
t The estimator sc is determined simultaneously with- a2 in the solution to the system of equations, 
I = T V2/-rr u e-S/22 - sc + 2scN(sc/la) and LAP?2 = (2 + S2, where N(d) is the cumulative unit normal distribution function with upper integral limit d. 
with contract maturity, reflecting the lower market liquidity in the distant 
contracts. 
In the regression tests that follow, we rely primarily on the results 
using the method of moments estimate sc as the measure of the effective 
bid/ask spread to draw our inferences regarding the effect of the imple- 
mentation of the top-step rule. To safeguard against incorrect inferences, 
however, we also report the regression results using the mean absolute 
price change estimate SB. 
D. Methodology 
The methodology employed in the analysis of the effect of the top-step 
rule involves two regression models. In the first, the estimated effective 
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spread, SPRD,, is regressed on a dummy variable, D,, that is assigned a 
value zero in the period preceding June 22, 1987-the date on which the 
top-step rule was first used-and one in all subsequent days, that is, 
SPRD, = a 
+ oaDt + Et. (7) 
The coefficient eo is the key to our analysis. If ae is not different from 
zero, the null hypothesis that there is no difference b tween the effective 
bid/ask spreads in the dual trader/nondual trader markets cannot be re- 
futed. If a, is significantly less than zero, the null hypothesis is refuted 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that dual trader markets are more 
costly than nondual trader markets. If a I is significantly greater than zero, 
the null hypothesis is refuted in favor of the alternative hypothesis that 
dual trader markets are less costly.27 
In the second testing procedure, the multiple regression model 
SPRD, = c0o 
+ aDt + L2RISKt + a3VOLt + e, (8) 
is performed. This regression specification is based on the arguments 
presented in Section I; that is, the effective bid/ask spread should be an 
inverse function of the trading volume and a direct function of risk. No 
information is available on the number of market makers in the pit. The 
interpretation f the multiple regression results is the same as that of the 
simple regression results-the focus is on ae. The additional variables 
are included to ensure that the dummy variable is not acting as a proxy for 
trading volume and/or risk rather than the dual/nondual trader periods. 
In the regression results that follow, the sample period begins on March 
1, 1983, because S&P 500 futures options did not trade until that date, 
so no implied volatility estimates (recall that the implied volatility from 
the S&P 500 futures option prices is used as a proxy for risk) could be 
estimated. In addition, the sample ends on October 9, 1987-one week 
prior to the October 1987 market crash. This reason for this is that the 
market crash may have affected (increased) the effective bid/ask spread 
in the S&P 500 futures pit due to factors other than those in equation 
(8). Many market makers suffered large, unexpected losses in the days 
surrounding the crash. In some cases, these losses may have precipitated 
increases in the degree of risk aversion of market makers and hence 
increases in the rate of compensation (spread) for bearing the risk of the 
inventory position that they assume in order to accommodate customers. 
The crash may even have precipitated the departure of market makers 
from the futures pit, causing a decrease in competition and an increase 
in spread. 
27 This test is tantamount to a t-test of the difference between the mean spreads in the 
pre- and post-top-step-rule periods. 
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E. S&P 500 Regression Results 
Tables 5 and 6 contain the regression results for the S&P 500 futures 
contracts for Sample 1 and Sample 2, respectively. The pooled results 
indicate that the hypothesis that there is no difference in the effective 
spread between markets that permit dual trading and those that restrict 
dual trading is rejected. For example, the Sample 2 (the sample which 
eliminates the effects of bid and ask quotes from the data) results reported 
in Table 6 indicate that during the period immediately after the top-step 
rule was implemented, the mean implied spread is .0116 higher on average 
than it was during the period in which dual trading was permitted. For 
the same sample, the mean absolute price change is .0138 higher. Both 
of these differences are significant from a statistical standpoint and are 
very meaningful in an economic sense. The parameter estimates indicate 
that the effective bid/ask spread has increased by more than 20 percent 
as a result of the top-step rule, independent of which measure of the 
spread is used. 
On a contract-by-contract basis, the Sample 2 results are very similar. 
The nearby contract, for example, has an increased implied spread of 
.0035, and this increase is significantly greater than zero, as is indicated 
by the t-ratio f 8.05. The increase in spread for the second nearby con- 
tract is .0148, and the increase in spread for the third nearby contract is 
.0397. Both of these increases are also significant in a statistical sense. 
The contract-by-contract results using the mean absolute price as the 
dependent variable show that the spread increases after the top-step rule 
was implemented are generally larger and more significant than those of 
the implied spread. Presumably, this result arises because the mean abso- 
lute price change is an inflated measure of the effective bid/ask spread. 
The simple linear regression results for Sample 1 (reported in Table 5) 
are very similar to those of Sample 2. Both the implied spread and the 
mean absolute price change are significantly higher in the post-top-step- 
rule period in the pooled regressions as well as on contract-by-contract 
bases. Before attaching too much importance to these results, however, 
we must be reminded that the reported simple linear regression results 
may be driven by greater risk and/or lower trading volume during the 
post-top-step-rule period. To properly evaluate any change in the effec- 
tive spread, we must account for the spread's determinants (see Sec- 
tion I). 
Tables 5 and 6 also contain the Sample 1 and Sample 2 results of 
the multiple regressions where risk and trading volume are included as 
explanatory variables. In general, the coefficients ofthe risk and trading 
volume variables appear with the expected signs. The spread increases 
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with risk and decreases with trading volume. The risk variable enters 
more strongly than does trading volume. The t-ratios for the risk coeffi- 
cient are large positive values. The t-ratios for the trading volume variable 
are smaller in absolute magnitude, and occasionally the sign of the coef- 
ficient is positive. 
Finally, it is important to note that the results reported in Tables 5 and 
6 are based on a linear regression model. This facilitates the economic 
interpretations below, where aggregate increased trading costs are esti- 
mated. It is worth noting, however, that the model was also estimated in 
log-linear form, with no change in the statistical inferences. 
For purposes of economic interpretation, we focus on the multiple 
regression results where the implied spread is used as the dependent 
variable and Sample 2 is used and attempt to measure aggregate costs. 
Overall, the pooled results indicate that the implied spread for the S&P 
500 futures contract has increased significantly. The estimated increase 
is .0087, and its t-ratio is 9.23. To evaluate the economic importance of 
this result, consider that in the seventy-eight-day period following the 
implementation f the top-step rule, total trading volume for the three 
nearby futures was 5,920,391 contracts. Estimated increased trading 
costs are therefore .0087 x 5,920,391 x 500 or $25,753,701. Alterna- 
tively, since the pooled regression equally weights each contract maturity 
on each day of the sample period, it may be more appropriate to use the 
contract-specific parameter estimates, .0027, .0104, and .0272, for the 
three nearby contracts, respectively, and the contract-specific trading 
volumes in the seventy-eight-day period following the implementation f 
the top-step rule, 5,210,671, 699,427, and 10,293, respectively. Under this 
approach, the estimated increase in trading costs for the seventy-eight- 
day period are 
(.0027 x 5,210,671 + .0104 x 699,427 + .0272 x 10,293) 
x $500 = $10,811,411. 
These aggregate cost estimates are intended to be illustrative only. 
Implicitly, we have assumed that all trading volume is customer elated. 
This is not the case. Some of the trading volume is between traders, 
hence our estimate of aggregate trading costs is overstated. Customer 
volume is almost certainly greater than half of the total, so halving the 
cost estimates hould provide conservative stimates of aggregate costs, 
and these estimates remain economically meaningful. In addition, we 
have also implicitly assumed that trading volume (and pattern) is as high 
in the post-top-step-rule period as it would have been without he imple- 
mentation of the rule. To examine the implication of this assumption, 
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TABLE 5 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE S&P 500 INDEX FUTURES CONTRACT EFFECTIVE DAILY SPREAD 
SPRD, = aet + alD, + a2RISKt + 3 VOLt + Et 
No. OF 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
CONTRACT MATURITY OBSERVATIONS o0 t(t(o)* (&1)* &2 t(&2)* 3 t()* 
Sample 1: SPRD, 
SB = mean ab- 
solute price 
change on 
day t: 
Pooled 5,232 .0667 237.30 .0055 4.81 
Nearby 1,166 .0505 446.99 .0032 7.35 
2 1,166 .0465 210.14 .0135 15.72 
3 1,166 .0743 191.04 .0127 8.46 
Distant 1,166 .0842 228.80 .0042 2.93 
Pooled 5,232 .0505 40.83 .0033 3.18 .0014 17.10 - .3595 - 37.79 
Nearby 1,166 .0438 82.65 .0019 4.46 .0004 12.54 - .0013 - .28 
2 1,166 .0258 29.18 .0093 13.04 .0013 23.22 .0656 6.83 
3 1,166 .0362 23.48 .0055 4.40 .0025 24.48 -9.3587 -4.14 
Distant 1,166 .0630 37.15 - .0004 - .30 .0014 12.84 - 35.4470 -3.89 
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Sample 1: SPRDt 
sc = implied 
spread on 
day t: 
Pooled 5,232 .0633 224.29 .0064 5.52 
Nearby 1,166 .0501 562.47 .0032 9.41 
2 1,166 .0452 220.01 .0082 10.26 
3 1,166 .0702 144.71 .0152 8.13 
Distant 1,166 .0787 159.98 .0081 4.24 
Pooled 5,232 .0512 39.11 .0048 4.36 .0010 12.37 -.2937 -29.19 
Nearby 1,166 .0453 106.99 .0023 6.72 .0003 11.38 - .0002 - .06 
2 1,166 .0291 34.02 .0049 7.18 .0010 18.31 .0970 10.45 
3 1,166 .0304 14.63 .0075 4.48 .0026 19.58 -6.5563 -2.15 
Distant 1,166 .0671 27.75 .0056 2.91 .0008 4.91 -8.0607 - .62 
NOTE.-Results are provided for the period March 1, 1983-October 9, 1987. The effective daily spread of the contract is regressed on a dummy variable whose 
value is zero in the period preceding the implementation of the top-step trading rule on June 22, 1987, and one in the period June 22, 1987-October 9, 1987, on 
the implied volatility from S&P 500 futures option prices, and on the trading volume of the futures contract. The implied volatility is computed each day during 
the sample period using a nonlinear regression of observed call and put option transaction prices for the S&P 500 futures option contract on model prices. The 
options were constrained to have a maturity between 15 and 110 days. The futures price preceding the option transaction was used as an estimate of the true 
futures price. Where the futures option price was below the intrinsic value of the option, the option transaction was eliminated from the estimation. The model 
used to price the American-style futures options is the quadratic approximation of Giovanni Barone-Adesi & Robert E. Whaley, Efficient Analytic Approximation 
of American Option Values, 42 J. Fin. 301 (1987). * The t-ratio corresponds to a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient a equals zero. 
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TABLE 6 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE S&P 500 INDEX FUTURES CONTRACT EFFECTIVE DAILY SPREAD 
SPRD, = ao + olD, + ct2RISK, + ac3VOLt + Et 
No. OF 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
CONTRACT MATURITY OBSERVATIONS 0 t(&o)* I1 t(&l)* 2 t(&2)* L3 t(&3)* 
Sample 2: SPRD, 
SB = mean ab- 
solute price 
change on 
day t:t 
Pooled 2,707 .0549 203.06 .0138 12.95 
Nearby 1,166 .0507 364.26 .0034 6.34 
2 1,165 .0544 182.02 .0196 16.97 
3 370 .0691 52.85 .0424 6.96 
Pooled 2,707 .0366 40.00 .0105 10.62 .0015 19.18 - .1595 -20.31 
Nearby 1,166 .0439 67.46 .0022 4.30 .0006 13.22 - .0342 -6.24 
2 1,165 .0290 23.31 .0144 14.37 .0017 21.39 - .0935 -6.92 
3 370 .0230 4.12 .0280 4.75 .0031 8.06 2.1646 .28 
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Sample 2: SPRD, 
sc = implied 
spread on 
day t:t 
Pooled 2,707 .0540 213.02 .0116 11.55 
Nearby 1,166 .0505 445.11 .0035 8.05 
2 1,165 .0537 188.66 .0148 13.45 
3 370 .0658 50.62 .0397 6.54 
Pooled 2,707 .0386 34.03 .0087 9.23 .0012 16.91 -.1356 - 17.98 
Nearby 1,166 .0454 86.44 .0027 6.47 .0005 13.57 - .0380 -8.60 
2 1,165 .0323 26.12 .0104 10.45 .0014 18.12 - .0790 -5.88 
3 370 .0262 4.59 .0272 4.53 .0027 6.80 2.1545 .27 
NOTE.-Results are provided for the period March 1, 1983-October 9, 1987. The effective daily spread of the contract is regressed on a dummy variable whose 
value is zero in the period preceding the implementation of the top-step trading rule on June 22, 1987, and one in the period June 22, 1987-October 9, 1987, on 
the implied volatility from S&P 500 futures option prices, and on the trading volume of the futures contract. The implied volatility is computed each day during 
the sample period using a nonlinear regression of observed call and put option transaction prices for the S&P 500 futures option contract on model prices. The 
options were constrained to have a maturity between 15 and 110 days. The futures price preceding the option transaction was used as an estimate of the true 
futures price. Where the futures option price was below the intrinsic value of the option, the option transaction was eliminated from the estimation. The model 
used to price the American-style futures options is the quadratic approximation of Giovanni Barone-Adesi & Robert E. Whaley, Efficient Analytic Approximation 
of American Option Values, 42 J. Fin. 301 (1987). 
* The t-ratio corresponds to a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient a equals zero. 
t No meaningful results are obtained for the distant contract since there are no days during the period June 22-October 9, 1987, in which the distant contract 
had Sample 2 price changes. 
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we recompute aggregate trading costs using the trading volume figures 
reported in Table 3 for the period June 23-October 22, 1986, 5,154,978, 
804,010, and 4,830, and find that the aggregate cost is $11,205,760, slightly 
higher than when the 1987 trading volume figures are used. 
Regardless of the cost estimate used, the implementation f the top- 
step rule appears to have increased significantly the effective bid/ask 
spread in the S&P 500 index futures pit. Throughout the S&P 500 test 
results, increased spreads in the period after the introduction fthe top- 
step rule are observed. 
F. MMI Control Group Tests 
The multiple regression results of the last subsection document in- 
creased trading costs in the S&P 500 futures market after the introduction 
of the top-step rule, independent of sample construction and effective 
trading cost estimator. The robustness of the results, however, may be 
influenced by (a) the lack of a control group, (b) the length of the pre-top- 
step-rule estimation period, and/or (c) regression model misspecification. 
To guard against hese possibilities, we perform control group tests using 
the MMI futures contract during the period January 2-October 9, 1987. 
The MMI futures is a close substitute for the S&P 500 futures. Although 
the MMI is more narrowly based with only twenty stocks, all of the 
stocks have large market capitalizations and comprise a significant pro- 
portion of the value-weighted S&P 500 index. The correlation between 
their weekly price movements during 1989, for example, was only slightly 
less than .95.28 The only significant differences between the contracts are 
that the MMI contract is about half the size of the S&P 500 futures 
contract and that the MMI contract has a monthly expiration cycle while 
the S&P 500 contract expires quarterly. With respect o this latter consid- 
eration, our tests of relative spreads and trading volumes in this section 
compare the first hree nearby (monthly) MMI contracts with the nearby 
(quarterly) S&P 500 contracts. 
The regression analyses conducted in this section attempt to circum- 
vent possible model misspecification bymaking the implicit assumption 
that the economic factors affecting bid/ask spread and trading volume 
are the same for the MMI futures contract as the S&P 500 futures con- 
tract. The tests are straightforward. First, we regress the ratio of the 
spread of the nearby S&P 500 futures to the average spread of the three 
nearby MMI futures on a dummy variable that is zero during the pre-top- 
28 See Hans R. Stoll & Robert E. Whaley, Futures and Options: Theory and Applications 
106 (1993). 
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TABLE 7 
RELATIVE DAILY IMPLIED BID/ASK SPREADS AND RELATIVE TRADING VOLUME REGRESSIONS 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
No. OF _ 
OBSERVATIONS t0 t(^)* t( 1) 
SPRDsrp 500ot Relative spread regressions: 
SPRDS&,500, 
+ oIDt + Et SPRDMMI,? 
Sample 1 196 .6744 17.59 .0610 1.00 
Sample 2 196 .6701 17.29 .0801 1.30 
VOLsrp 500,t Relative trading volume regression: VOL = o + olD,t + E VOLMMI, t 
196 6.9456 34.14 -1.0695 -3.32 
NOTE.-Results are presented of the regression of the ratio of daily implied bid/ask spread (trading 
volume) of the nearby S&P 500 futures contract to the average daily implied bid/ask spread (total trading 
volume) of the three nearby MMI futures contracts on a dummy variable whose value is zero in the 
period preceding the introduction of the top-step trading rule, January 2-June 19, 1987, and one in the 
period after, June 22-October 9, 1987. 
* The t-ratio corresponds to a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient x equals zero. 
step-rule period, January 2-June 22, 1987, and one during the post-top- 
step rule from June 22-October 9, 1987, that is, 
SPRDS&P 500, t
SPRDMMI,t 
Next, we regress the ratio of the nearby S&P 500 futures contract trading 
volume to the trading volume of the three nearby MMI futures on the 
same dummy variable, 
VOLS&P 500, t VOLS&P 500, + OaDt + Et. (10) 
VOLMMjt 
The coefficient al in the two regressions is an indicator of whether or 
not the bid/ask spread (trading volume) of the S&P 500 contract changed 
relative to the MMI contract. 
Table 7 contains the results of the bid/ask spread regressions. The 
estimates of the intercept term, 
&0, 
indicate that prior to the introduction 
of the top-step rule, the spread in the S&P 500 futures market was about 
67 percent of the average size of the spread of the three nearby MMI 
futures contracts. The relative spread increased after the introduction of 
the rule. The slope coefficient estimates are positive in both the Sample 
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1 and Sample 2 regressions. The Sample 2 results indicate that the nearby 
S&P 500 futures spread increased to a level of about 75 percent of the 
average MMI futures spread, an increase of about 12 percent. Although 
this increase is only marginally significant, it is considerably larger than 
the Table 6 result, where the increase in the bid/ask spread of the nearby 
S&P 500 futures contract was reported to be .0027, an increase of about 
5.4 percent (assuming the pre-top-rule spread is .05). 
Table 7 also contains the relative trading volume regression results. 
Prior to the top-step rule, the trading volume of the nearby S&P 500 
futures appears to be about 6.94 times higher than the total trading vol- 
ume of the three nearby MMI contracts. After the rule, the factor drops 
significantly to about 5.88. The implementation of the rule apparently 
caused the trading volume in the nearby S&P 500 futures to drop relative 
to the total trading volume of the three nearby MMI futures contracts. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the merits of dual trading. 
Specifically, we consider the cost of implementing the CME's top-step 
rule in the S&P 500 index futures pit in June 1987. Under this rule, only 
exclusive brokers are permitted access to the top step of the S&P 500 
index futures pit. An effect of this rule has been to substantially curtail 
the volume of trading executed by dual traders. The empirical analysis 
conducted in this study indicates that the effective bid/ask spread in- 
creased and trading volume decreased as a result of restricting dual trad- 
ing. During the period immediately following the implementation of the 
rule, June 22-October 9, 1987, the estimated increase in trading costs is 
at least $5 million. 
If restricting dual trading is so costly, why then did the CME choose 
to implement the top-step rule and then subsequently to prohibit dual 
trading in all of its futures markets that trade an average of at least 10,000 
contracts a day? One plausible explanation is that the CME continues to 
be threatened by more intrusive regulation by the CFTC. By self- 
imposing restrictions on highly active contracts, the CME is voluntarily 
incurring modest costs in highly active contract markets in an attempt to 
appease the CFTC and avoid the much higher expected costs of a dual 
trading ban. 
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